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Response

It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, No, It’s Super
Precedent: A Response to Farber and
Gerhardt
Randy E. Barnett†
In recent years, as the popularity of originalist interpretation has risen from the ashes of its supposed demise in the
1980s,1 its critics have increasingly harped on its supposed incompatibility with the doctrine of stare decisis. Or perhaps
more accurately, they have asserted stare decisis to defend
their favorite cases and doctrines from originalist critiques. In
some measure, this response has been effective because
originalists themselves are divided on the role of precedent visa-vis originalism.2
Some originalists—let us call them “faint-hearted originalists,” which is how Justice Scalia describes himself 3—base their
originalism in important part on “the rule of law” with its resultant predictability and stability, upon which stare decisis
† Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law
Center. E-mail: rbarnett@gmail.com. My thanks to Scott Scheule for his editing and research assistance.
1. See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L.
REV. 611, 611–29 (1999) (describing the rise of the “New Originalism”); see
also Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1124–48 (2003) (discussing the contributions to this development played by Robert Bork, Steven
Calabresi, Frank Easterbrook, Gary Lawson, John Manning, Michael McConnell, Michael Paulsen, Saikrishna Prakash, Antonin Scalia, Guy Seidman, and
others).
2. See Symposium, Stare Decisis, 22 CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming
Apr. 2006).
3. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV.
849, 864 (1989) (“I hasten to confess that in a crunch I may prove a fainthearted originalist.”). On the basis of his writings and judicial decisions, I reluctantly conclude that Justice Scalia is not really an originalist. See Randy E.
Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of Faint-Hearted Originalism, 75 U.
CINN. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2006).
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also seems to be based. Perhaps most importantly, a commitment to some degree of stare decisis allows faint-hearted
originalists to plead nolo contendere with certain precedents
that they would rather not challenge because to do so would be
political suicide. Or so they think. Of course, it is also possible
that some originalists simply prefer the results of certain
precedents over the original meaning of the Constitution that
these cases have supplanted, and they are looking for a limitation on their professed commitment to originalism.
Other originalists like Mike Paulsen,4 Gary Lawson,5 and
myself 6—call us “fearless originalists,” perhaps because we will
never personally have to fear Senate confirmation hearings—
reject the doctrine of stare decisis in the following sense: if a
prior decision of the Supreme Court is in conflict with the
original meaning of the text of the Constitution, it is the Constitution and not precedent that binds present and future Justices. The reason why fearless originalists reject stare decisis
can be summarized by the following syllogism:
(1) Originalism amounts to the claim that the meaning of
the Constitution should remain the same until it is properly
changed.
(2) None of the three branches of government on which the
written Constitution imposes limits should be able to alter
these limitations, either alone or in concert, without properly
amending the Constitution in writing.
(3) For this reason, the Supreme Court cannot change the
Constitution which it is sworn to uphold and enforce.
(4) Were the Court mistakenly to decide a case that adopts
an interpretation that contradicts the original meaning of the
text, and this mistake became entrenched by the doctrine of
precedent, then the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the text
would trump its original meaning.
(5) In this manner, the doctrine of stare decisis is inconsistent with originalism.

4. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming Apr. 2006).
5. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23 (1994).
6. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as it Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming Apr.
2006);
available
at
http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/papers/pdf_files/
BarnettR050205.pdf. The argument I make there is summarized in the next
few paragraphs.
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The normative case for originalism is based, in large measure, on the superiority of the enacted text over the opinions of
members of the government whom it is supposed to govern and
limit—including members of the Supreme Court.7 I do not see
how an originalist can accept that the Supreme Court could
change the meaning of the text from what it meant as enacted
and still remain an originalist. In other words, once it becomes
appropriate for the Supreme Court to discard original meaning
and the original meaning of the text is thereby reduced to a factor among many considerations by which the Constitution is
“interpreted,” the method being used is no longer originalism.
I suppose we can say that faint-hearted originalists refuse
to ignore original meaning completely, as some nonoriginalists
are willing to do. But whether they are willing to follow it or
discard it is being determined by other nonoriginalist principles—such as the need for stability and predictability—an approach with which many nonoriginalists would be entirely comfortable. Indeed, it is fashionable these days for nonoriginalists
to include some role for history in their methods of interpretation,8 as a starting point, as a factor to be combined with other
“modalities,”9 or as meaning that must be “translated” into
modern content.10 It becomes quite difficult to distinguish these
nonoriginalists from faint-hearted originalists.
The rejection by fearless originalists of stare decisis when
it conflicts with original meaning is not, I hasten to add, a rejection of all use of precedent. Elsewhere, I describe several important roles for precedent within fearless originalism.11 Decisions reached by the Court in prior cases (1) can be followed in
nonconstitutional cases, which make up the bulk of what the
Supreme Court decides; (2) can provide constitutional construc-

7. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 89–117 (2004) (expanding the normative argument for

originalism beyond that presented above and in Barnett, supra note 1).
8. See James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1335, 1344 (1997) (“In recent years, the originalist premise
has also been manifested in the emerging strain of broad originalism in liberal
and progressive constitutional theory.”).
9. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–14
(1991) (counting both “historical” and “textual” as useful and legitimate “modalities” of constitutional argument).
10. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1365, 1367–68 (1997) (defending his “translation” theory).
11. See Barnett, supra note 6.
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tions that are often needed to apply the provisions of the text to
actual cases and controversies; (3) can generate reliance claims
by particular individuals upon unconstitutional governmental
actions that the Court has previously permitted; (4) can provide
epistemic guidance in the face of uncertain original meaning;
and (5) can perhaps also be used to resolve latent ambiguities
in the text by “fixing” its meaning until the Constitution is formally amended.12
I will not repeat here my explanation of each of these potentially proper uses of precedent within a theory of originalism, and mention them now solely to emphasize that even a
fearless commitment to originalism does not forgo all uses of
precedent. It is fearless only in the sense that it acknowledges
that Supreme Court decisions can never trump the clear original meaning of the text—a proposition denied by nonoriginalists. In this regard, although evolving constitutional law may
well share some of the qualities of a common-law system, this
body of judicially-developed doctrine is “bounded” by a text that
it cannot supersede, in the very same manner that statutes are
traditionally thought to trump common-law judicial decisions.
I. POSITING SUPER PRECEDENT
In his Essay in this symposium, Dan Farber extols the virtues of precedent,13 many of which have led some self-described
originalists to the faint-hearted school. Among the virtues he
lists are (1) efficiency, by which he means saving time and
trouble,14 (2) humility,15 (3) stability,16 (4) uniformity or equality, in the sense of treating like cases alike,17 (5) the ability of

12. I am myself uncertain about the last of these five uses of precedent,
but list it here in the interest of completeness.
13. See Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90
MINN. L. REV. 1173 (2006).
14. Id. at 1177 (“One of these universal justifications is efficiency: it saves
time and trouble to rely on earlier decisions.”).
15. Id. at 1178 (“A second reason is humility. It would be arrogant to assume that we alone have access to wisdom.”).
16. Id. at 1177 (“It is simply unworkable to leave everything up for grabs
all of the time.”).
17. Id. at 1179 (“It seems arbitrary for a case to be decided one way this
year, perhaps leading to a prisoner’s execution or other serious consequences,
and for an identical case to be decided the opposite way next year simply because of a change in judicial personnel.”).
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courts to provide guidance in the future,18 and (6) its tendency
towards neutral principles.19
With all this going for the doctrine of stare decisis, one almost expects Farber to contend that precedent should never be
reversed. But of course he is far too realistic and pragmatic for
that. We all know that precedents are reversible under the
right set of circumstances, and even under the wrong. The
sixty-four thousand dollar question for the voluminous jurisprudence of precedent is identifying exactly when to adhere
and when to reverse. I cannot survey this literature here. Suffice to say that, despite these well-known advantages of precedent so ably summarized by Farber, everyone favors reversing
precedent sometimes.
In his Essay, Farber never identifies the circumstances in
which precedent should be reversed—which I think is a major
weakness of any serious treatment of the doctrine of stare decisis. But he does suggest which precedents should not be reversed. He calls these “bedrock precedents,”20 but we may also
refer to them, like Michael Gerhardt and Senator Arlen Specter, as “super precedent.”21 Here is how Farber describes these
very special precedents:
At least in certain kinds of cases, precedent gains added importance in the constitutional area. One purpose of having a written constitution is to create a stable framework for government. This goal
would be undermined if the Court failed to give special credence to
bedrock precedents—precedents that have become the foundation for
large areas of important doctrine. Some obvious examples involve the
rulings of the New Deal era upholding the validity of the Social Security system and other federal taxing and spending programs, and
those recognizing federal jurisdiction over the economy. These ome-

18. Id. at 1179 (“[O]nly by following the reasoning of previous decisions
can the courts provide guidance for the future, rather than a series of unconnected outcomes in particular cases.”).
19. Id. (“[T]he judge is pushed to a form of neutrality—not the neutrality
of being value-free, but the neutrality of articulating standards that one is
willing to live with in the future.”).
20. Id. passim.
21. Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204 passim
(2006); Jeffrey Rosen, So, Do You Believe in ‘Superprecedent’?, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 30, 2005, § 4, at 1 (“The term superprecedents first surfaced at the Supreme Court confirmation hearings of Judge John Roberts, when Senator
Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania, the chairman of the Judiciary Committee,
asked him whether he agreed that certain cases like Roe had become superprecedents or ‘super-duper’ precedents—that is, that they were so deeply embedded in the fabric of law they should be especially hard to overturn.”).
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lettes cannot be unscrambled today, as even some devoted believers in
originalism acknowledge. Likewise, it is far too late in the day to invalidate independent agencies, as some originalists would like, or to
undo the twentieth century rulings that “incorporated” the Bill of
Rights and made it applicable to the states, or to reconsider the constitutionality of segregation.22

It is not just that overruling these precedents would be
“imprudent.”23 Farber further claims that, “in an important
sense, it would run against the purposes of constitutionalism.
Overruling these doctrines would create just the kind of uncertainty and instability that constitutions (even more than other
laws) are designed to avoid . . . .”24
Moreover, he claims, “Legitimate or not, these modern constitutional doctrines are here to stay as a realistic matter.”25 By
this he means something more than “might makes right.”
Rather, these super precedents are somehow “constitutional” in
a way that even parts of the written Constitution are not:
Plenary federal power over fiscal and economic matters, independent
agencies, and application of the Bill of Rights to the states are now integral parts of our system of government; in some ways, they are more
“constitutional” than some of the more obscure parts of the written
Constitution.26

One possible “pragmatic” approach to “omelettes [that]
cannot be unscrambled”27 would be simply to refuse to revisit
decisions justifying existing institutions and to consider these
particular decisions to be settled by means of something like a
constitutional “grandfather clause.” Like criminal convictions,
existing government institutions and programs under this approach to precedent would not be declared unconstitutional after the fact. But the decisions by which they were upheld
would, if found to conflict with the original meaning of the text,
lose what Dworkin refers to as their “gravitational force.”28
“This far but no farther” could be the gradualist way to reestablish the original meaning of the text as constitutional law.29

22. Farber, supra note 13, at 1180 (footnotes omitted).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1180–81.
25. Id. at 1181.
26. Id. (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 1180.
28. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 121 (1997); Ronald
Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1089 (1975).
29. To be clear, I am not endorsing this gradualist approach, but simply
identifying it as a possible response to the concern about overly rapid change.
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But Farber claims more for these super precedents than a
gradualist approach to changes in constitutional law would
provide.
[T]his is an untenable stance in a legal system that seeks some form
of coherence. . . .
A sensible legal system can tolerate having a few small patches of
doctrine retained because of practical imperatives but rejected in
principle. But a legal system in which huge swathes of the law are
considered unprincipled, while small corners are governed by principle, makes no sense at all. Bedrock rulings cannot be “limited to their
facts” if the legal system is to have any claim to integrity; rather, they
must be given generative force as precedents.30

So these bedrock principles are pretty super indeed. They
not only cannot be reversed, but they must be extended into the
indefinite future. As Farber explains:
Adherence to precedent does not mean simply refusing to overrule
past decisions—it means taking them seriously as starting points for
analysis in future cases. This notion derives partly from reasoning by
analogy based on similarities between the facts of cases, but more importantly, it reflects a need to give credence to the reasoning in earlier opinions.31

Wow. Whatever happened to the “living constitution”?
II. TWO FALLACIES OF SUPER PRECEDENT
Given the enormous potential practical and legal import of
adopting a concept of super precedents, two obvious questions
arise. What justifies super precedents trumping the original
meaning of the text of the Constitution? How do we tell which
precedents are super precedents? Given that Professor Farber
is a pragmatist who has coauthored a wonderfully engaging
book about the “misguided quest for constitutional foundations,”32 we should not really expect a theoretical answer to either of these questions. And in this regard, we are not disappointed.
Although Farber’s Essay begins with the aforementioned
paean to the six benefits of precedent, these benefits attach to
the ordinary reversible precedents as well as to bedrock or super precedents. In other words, these benefits argue for a respect for precedents generally. They do not tell us when prece30. Farber, supra note 13 at 1183 (footnotes omitted).
31. Id.
32. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING
CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS
(2002).
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dents can be overruled, as everyone concedes sometimes can
and should be done. Nor does a list of these benefits help us
distinguish mere ordinary precedents from those super precedents that, like Superman himself, “came to earth with powers
and abilities far beyond those of mortal” cases.33
So there must be something extra these super precedents
possess that mere mortal precedents do not. While Farber is
not entirely clear about this, I think two particular qualities
emerge from his discussion. First, these precedents seem
deeply embedded in current institutional practice, such that
overruling them would wreak much social disruption.34 Second,
no one wants to see them overturned.35
The fact that precedents are deeply embedded, however,
only goes to their direct reversal, and does not argue for their
continued application to new circumstances beyond their immediate application. It is one thing to uphold the Social Security system; it is another to create a new entitlement scheme on
the same constitutional principle.
Any claim that no one wants to see these precedents overturned is of course an exaggeration. If no one wanted them
overturned, they would never be challenged—and there would
exist no fearless originalists doing the challenging. Of course,
the end of much originalist scholarship is to justify rather than
undercut super precedents such as Brown precisely because no
one wants them reversed.36 But other super precedents are
more contested. For these we may say that some people do not
want them reversed while others do.
Indeed, the very concept of super precedent has been invented to privilege the claims of the former, who would preserve controversial decisions, against the latter, who would see
them reversed. Farber and others invoke the concept of super
precedent on the basis of the rule of law or claim that doing so
is necessary to avoid chaos, or they find some other criterion to
33. The Adventures of Superman!, http://superman.ws/fos/thescreen/tv1
(last visited Apr. 2, 2006) (quoting the opening to the 1950s Superman television series).
34. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 13, at 1180–81 (describing the impracticality of overruling these precedents and the instability that would result).
35. See id. at 1182 (claiming that “[v]irtually everyone” agrees that these
precedents cannot be overturned).
36. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation
Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 1131–40 (1995); Michael W. McConnell, The
Originalist Justification for Brown: A Reply to Professor Klarman, 81 VA. L.
REV. 1937 (1995).
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avoid having to defend these precedents on their merits. This is
powerful stuff, and there should be some very strong reason for
taking the merits of prior constitutional decisions off the table,
but I find no such compelling arguments in Dan Farber’s
Essay.
Nor does Michael Gerhardt’s Essay for this symposium
provide a credible justification for avoiding the merits of some
precedents deemed “super.” Instead, like Farber, Gerhardt says
that:
[s]uper precedents are those constitutional decisions in which public
institutions have heavily invested, repeatedly relied, and consistently
supported over a significant period of time. Super precedents are
deeply imbedded into our law and lives through the subsequent activities of the other branches. Super precedents seep into the public
consciousness, and become a fixture of the legal framework . . . . Super precedents are the clearest instances in which the institutional
values promoted by fidelity to precedent—consistency, stability, predictability, and social reliance—have become irredeemably compelling. Thus, super precedents take on a special status in constitutional
law as landmark opinions, so encrusted and deeply embedded in constitutional law that they have become practically immune to reconsideration and reversal.37

The rest of his Essay is an attempt to explain how some famous
Supreme Court decisions qualify as super precedents based on
one or another aspect of this definition.
Both Farber and Gerhardt want to claim that super precedents are somehow binding on courts in a way that ordinary
precedents are not.38 In essence, they are asserting that pre37. Gerhardt, supra note 21, at 1205–06 (footnotes omitted).
38. In a section replying to this Response and other criticisms of the concept of super precedent, id. at 1221–24, Professor Gerhardt seems not to appreciate fully the nature of his claim as he now characterizes the issue: “Super
precedent is a construct employed to signify the relatively rare times when it
makes eminent sense to recognize that the correctness of a decision is a secondary (or far less important) consideration than its permanence.” Id. at 1221.
But this is just a description of the normal doctrine of stare decisis—that the
correctness of a decision is secondary to its permanence. Under the normal
doctrine of stare decisis, however, the Court can reconsider a precedent when
it decides that the incorrectness of a precedent overrides the various considerations that support stare decisis. Professor Gerhardt admits as much when
he discusses the gradual erosion of the previously-super precedent of Plessy.
Id. at 1222 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown
v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). For his thesis to have any normative bite,
he needs to show why some precedents are entitled to more weight—so much
weight, in fact, that no Court may ever reconsider them no matter how wrong
they may be—than current notions of stare decisis provide. He needs to show
why the original meaning of the Constitution can be superceded by judicial
opinions that change with the times, but certain judicial opinions are fixed
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sent day courts are to be ruled by the “dead hand” of previous
courts. They want to claim that the Supreme Court ought not
to revisit a super precedent from its past, and should adhere to
the original meaning of the prior decision when it conflicts with
the original meaning of the text of the Constitution. When it
comes to these previous decisions of the Supreme Court, these
scholars reject a “living constitution.” Or perhaps the better
imagery is that, when it comes to super precedent, the Constitution itself must die so that super precedential decisions may
live on.
Such a normative claim would require considerable justification, but what both Farber and Gerhardt present is, if anything, a mere statement of fact. And the fact is this: for a variety of reasons, some previous decisions by the Court are not
likely to be reversed anytime soon. In Gerhardt’s words, they
are “so encrusted and deeply embedded in constitutional law
that they have become practically immune to reconsideration
and reversal.”39 But who would ever deny the truth of this sociological fact?
An explanation of why a particular decision will not soon
be overruled, however—and different explanations are offered
by Farber and Gerhardt on behalf of different super precedential decisions—is distinct from an argument for why it ought
not one day be reversed when the time is ripe. Although I hesitate to claim this about two scholars of whom I think so highly,
it strikes me that, in their defense of the irreversibility of super
precedents, both Farber and Gerhardt seem to be committing
two fundamental fallacies.40 The first is the conflation of the
forevermore. This he still fails to do. Simply reasserting the values that support “normal” stare decisis, such as they are, is inadequate to support his
normative argument. Nothing in his reply to this Response addresses the objections that follow in this Response to his argument for a constitutional doctrine super precedent (as distinct from the descriptive claim that some cases
are very widely accepted).
What explains the failure even to see the need for a normative argument
on behalf of “super” as opposed to ordinary precedent? I suspect that both
Gerhardt and Farber implicitly accept the present-day rejection of a “formalist” commitment to stare decisis, so “precedent” to them means merely a previously decided case that can be easily reversed whenever we conclude it is
wrongly decided. They then invoke the traditional formalist rationale for the
stability provided by stare decisis on behalf of so-called “super precedents,”
which are actually just “precedents” within the more formalist, traditional approach to stare decisis. But this is merely speculation on my part.
39. Id. at 1206.
40. Perhaps this is a product of the phenomenon known as “the normative
power of the factual.” See Adrian Vermeule, Political Constraints on Supreme
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“is” with the “ought”; the second is the conflation of the “actual”
with the “necessary.” Let me consider each fallacy in turn.
As I have already said, it is a sociological fact that some
cases are, as a practical matter, irreversible today. Observing
the existence of this fact, and even explaining why it is so,
without more, says nothing about whether such a case ought to
be reversed. To illustrate this, consider the history of racism in
this country. For well over two hundred years, the existence of
chattel slavery in America was a sociological fact. There are
many explanations for why this institution was “so encrusted
and deeply embedded” that it could not be abolished. Indeed,
the tragedy of the founding is that, notwithstanding the widespread concession by the founders that slavery was unjust, they
felt that, as a practical matter, they could do nothing to end it,
except perhaps put it on some long road to extinction. We all
know this story.
Given the practical irreversibility (at the time) of slavery,
Prigg v. Pennsylvania41 was a super precedent. Was Prigg’s
reading of the Fugitive Slave Clause of Article IV inevitable?
Hardly. Projecting ourselves back then, would anyone alive today reach the same result in Prigg? I think not. But as Robert
Cover tells the story, the judiciary back then—including even
some judges who favored abolition—decided that, for a variety
of reasons, they simply could not get in the way of slavery.42 If
there was any institution in our history that had insinuated itself into every corner of American institutions it was slavery
and the racism upon which it was based. The institutional and
economic “reliance” upon the constitutional law that sanctioned
slavery makes undoing the New Deal seem like child’s play.
So we got Prigg and Dred Scott.43 Both were super precedents that it took a Civil War and the resulting constitutional
amendments to reverse. Why amendments? Well, the Court
was not going to reverse itself. Even after the Civil War, these
cases were, after all, super precedents. Does their status as super precedents, standing alone, make these decisions normatively right as a matter of constitutional law and theory? The
undefended normative implication of Farber and Gerhardt’s invocation of the concept of super precedent is that Prigg and
Court Reform, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1154, 1162 (2006).
41. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
42. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 8–30 (1975).
43. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
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Dred Scott ought not have been reversed by the Supreme
Court.
Indeed, it is not entirely clear why, on their argument,
these super precedents ought to be reversed even by a constitutional amendment. After all, changing these institutions by
means of constitutional amendment would be just as wrenching
to the institutions that grew up in reliance on the system of
slavery and racism as would a judicial overruling. On their
analysis of super precedent, it should make no difference that a
super precedent’s reversal comes by means of constitutional
amendment rather than judicial overruling. By virtue of their
embeddedness and whatever other qualities render them super
precedent, they ought not be reversed. Period.
As a purely descriptive matter, Farber and Gerhardt’s approach may not be that wide of the mark. Even after the Constitution was formally amended, the Supreme Court refused to
enforce those amendments according to their original meaning,
because doing so would yield too radical a change to the existing institutions. In the Slaughter-House Cases,44 the 5–4 majority’s reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment was based almost exclusively on the
consequences of upholding the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, much to the consternation of the
dissent who denied that consequences determined the meaning
of the text.45 The racism responsible for Prigg and Dred Scott
was so encrusted and embedded in practice that the Supreme
Court was prepared to ignore even a written amendment, designed by radicals in Congress to end the legal infrastructure
perpetuating the racial subordination of recently emancipated
blacks. And the same pragmatic considerations that gave us
Prigg, Dred Scott, and Slaughter-House, gave us the mother of
all super precedents, Plessy v. Ferguson.46
Can you imagine the Supreme Court in 1896 acting on its
own to end or even begin to undermine the apartheid system
that was Jim Crow, given the national consensus that devel-

44. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
45. See id. at 124 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (“The great question is, what is
the true construction of the amendment? When once we find that, we shall
find the means of giving it effect. The argument from inconvenience ought not
to have a very controlling influence in questions of this sort.”).
46. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
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oped in the wake of the Compromise of 1877?47 Thanks to Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion in Plessy48—like the three dissenting opinions in Slaughter-House49—we can imagine it. By
this I mean that we can imagine it. The problem was that the
majority could not. It took fifty years before the super precedent of Plessy was replaced by Brown v. Board of Education,50
and as we know all too well, Brown itself did not spell the end
of Jim Crow. That took decades of political struggle and physical resistance to accomplish, only after which did Brown itself
become anything like a “super precedent.”
That the rightly-despised Prigg, Dred Scott and Plessy
qualify descriptively as super precedents because of their embedded nature and the social disruption their reversal would
have engendered is significant. For it reveals that the normative force of Farber and Gerhardt’s argument rests largely on
the fact that they, and presumably their readers, approve of the
cases they have chosen to call “super precedents.” Change the
subject to cases we all abhor and the challenge is then to find
pragmatic ways to reverse or limit embedded super precedents,
rather than perpetuate them.
The descriptive truth at the heart of Farber and Gerhardt’s
claim is that, for a variety of reasons, some decisions are not going to be changed anytime soon. Calling these decisions “super
precedents” does not add any weight to the argument that
these decisions ought not to change. Without an additional
normative reason why any particular super precedent is also
good, its mere practical irreversibility tells us nothing about
whether it should be overturned when the situation is ripe.
To be sure, some precedents could be super, in part, because they are constitutionally correct. I put Marbury,51 Brown,
and Griswold52 into this category. But simply identifying these
cases as super precedents is no substitute for showing why they
are rightly decided. And such a showing may very well require
the sort of foundational constitutional theory that Dan Farber
47. See C. VANN WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION: THE COMPROMISE
OF 1877 AND THE END OF RECONSTRUCTION 3 (Oxford Univ. Press 1991) (1951)

(“The compromise laid the political foundation for reunion. It established a
new sectional truce that proved more enduring than any previous one . . . .”).
48. See 163 U.S. at 552–65 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
49. See 83 U.S. at 83–111 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 111–24 (Bradley, J.,
dissenting); id. at 124–30 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
50. 347 U.S. 483.
51. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
52. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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considers to be a “misguided quest.”53 Even if he is right about
foundational constitutional theories, however, the case for continuing to respect some precedents while discarding others still
requires some normative constitutional argument besides the
claim that a particular decision cannot, as a practical matter,
be reversed overnight.
What would it take to make an irreversible super precedent like Plessy reversible? Well, what did it take? As already
noted, the reversal of Plessy required a sustained constitutional
and political assault, and perhaps also the intervention of a
world war, the prosecution of Nazi war criminals for genocide,
and a world-wide ideological struggle against Communism.
Does the fact that the apartheid system it sanctioned was
so deeply entrenched in American institutions as to render
Plessy the mother of all super precedents provide any normative argument whatsoever for refraining from changing it? Of
course not. Would the proper way of changing it include arguing how it conflicts with the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment and trying to get Justices on the Supreme Court to
agree? If such a constitutional claim is valid, why not? Certainly the fact that Plessy was a super precedent would provide
no valid argument against such an argumentative strategy.
What then does the fact that the cases cited by Farber and
Gerhardt are super precedents (if they are) tell us about their
constitutional correctness? Not a thing. What does their super
precedent status tell us about whether we should work to
change them by appointing Justices to the Court who do not accept them as foundational? Not a thing. Does it even tell us
whether one day they will be changed? Perhaps, but by no
means does it guarantee anything about their continued vitality. Plessy is dead. Its death was hastened in Brown by Justices
who rejected its inevitability, despite the continued presence of
embedded and encrusted racist social institutions.
Which brings me to Farber and Gerhardt’s second basic fallacy. They confuse “the actual” with “the necessary.” Assuming
they have identified cases that, for the variety of reasons they
discuss, are not actually going to be overruled tomorrow, does
this entail that these cases were necessarily decided the way
they were, are necessarily to be preserved, or will necessarily
survive? Of course not.

53. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 32.
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Take the Legal Tender Cases,54 a decision that both Farber
and Gerhardt think is an obvious candidate for super precedent
status because they cannot imagine a world without paper
money issued by the government that is required by law to be
accepted in payment of debts.55 There is, however, nothing necessary about government-issued fiat money unbacked by species. For over one hundred years (1715–1845), while England
was in the grip of the Bank of England, Scotland got along just
fine with a system of free banking in which competing banks
issued their own private notes that the general public could either accept or reject in tender of debts.56 As F.A. Hayek argued
in his book, Denationalisation of Money,57 there is no economic
imperative for central banks to issue notes that are declared by
law to be legal tender.58 Indeed, he contended that greater
monetary stability would be achieved with privately issued currency.59 With the enormous growth of electronic transfer payments, we may fast be approaching the day when central banks
will completely lose control of the money supply in favor of
competitively-issued financial instruments.
Now I am not qualified to debate the merits of free competitive banking versus central banking, but I certainly can
imagine such a system. Both Lawrence White and F.A. Hayek
are respected economists who contended that it would be superior to the remnants of central banking with which we live today.60 With this shift in factual assumptions, what now becomes of the necessity of maintaining the Legal Tender Cases?
This precedent does not seem so super anymore precisely because Farber and Gerhardt offer no constitutional or normative
argument on its behalf. Their only claim in support of its super
precedent status is that it is embedded in the current economy
and that they and others cannot imagine doing without government-issued paper money that was designated as legal ten-

54. Knox v. Lee (Legal Tender Cases), 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870).
55. See Farber, supra note 13, at 1181–82; Gerhardt, supra note 21, at
1213–14.
56. See LAWRENCE H. WHITE, FREE BANKING IN BRITAIN: THEORY, EXPERIENCE, AND DEBATE, 1800–1845, at 21–40 (2d ed., rev. and extended, Institute of Econ. Affairs 1995) (1984).
57. F.A. HAYEK, DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY (1976).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 78.
60. Id. at 99–101; WHITE, supra note 56, at 137–49 (concluding that free
banking “might perform better” than our system).
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der. Shift that factual assumption and the argument for super
precedent, such as it is, collapses.
One final point. While faint-hearted originalists accept
some precedents as done deals that cannot and ought not be reversed, even fearless originalists do not propose the wholesale
revolution of reversing all precedents that conflict with original
meaning overnight. There is nothing about a fearless commitment to uphold the text of the Constitution over inconsistent
prior decisions of the Court that commits one to rapid, as opposed to gradual, change that happens one case at a time.
Besides, even if they did advocate this, the descriptive
truth at the heart of the assertion of super precedents would
make immediate and disruptive change impossible. Exactly
how would overnight change happen within our system? Would
the seven full-time nonoriginalist Justices and one fainthearted (and part-time) originalist Justice all awaken one
morning determined to enforce the limits on government power
provided by the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper
Clause, the Second Amendment, the Ninth Amendment, and
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment?
No. In our constitutional system, the only way this sort of
change would happen is if the President nominates and the
Senate confirms enough Justices who are explicitly or implicitly
committed to originalism; the only way that will happen is after
a political struggle. It is in the nature of the political process by
which Supreme Court Justices are confirmed that, if this happens at all, it will happen exceedingly gradually. I suppose we
can also imagine persuading already sitting nonoriginalist Justices of the merits of originalism, but no originalist I know—
whether faint-hearted or fearless—pins their hopes on this ever
happening.
So then what are we arguing about? The answer is simple:
Whether this change should happen. Whether this way of interpreting the Constitution is the best. Whether the alternative
ways of “interpreting” the text—by ignoring just those passages
that restrict federal and state power—are legitimate. Engaging
in arguments like these is an essential part of a political process by which people are moved to change the status quo. Persuading people that the currently embedded constitutional law
is wrong because it conflicts with the actual Constitution, properly interpreted, is a necessary step to achieving a change in
the law, however gradual.

BARNETT_3FMT

1248

05/17/2006 09:08:26 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[90:1232

In defense of originalism, I have argued that a government
that lacks the actual unanimous consent of the people is illegitimate unless there are some procedural assurances that its
nonconsensual commands have not violated the rights retained
by the people. I have argued further that a written constitution
is a structural feature whose function is to subject nonconsensual government to a rule of law that limits its powers to actions that do not violate the rights of the people; that this
structural feature is destroyed if the very persons on whom
written constraints are imposed can alter or gut their meaning
as they desire so as to expand their coercive powers over the
people; that for these reasons, the meaning of the written Constitution must remain the same until it is properly changed by
an equally written amendment.61
Against this argument for originalism, the assertion of the
existence of so-called super precedent is simply nonresponsive.
It is, in short, a nonargument. But suppose we grant Farber
and Gerhardt their normative inference from their descriptive
claim. Then I posit the existence of a rule of law that precedes
any of the super precedents they cite—a rule of law that might
be called “super-duper precedent”: the text of the Constitution
itself.
At the heart of the intuition that a particular case is a super precedent is the truism that no one will get confirmed to
the Supreme Court who denies its binding force. So be it. Now
let’s see someone get confirmed to the Supreme Court who denies the binding force of the text of the Constitution. Or who
asserts that the Supreme Court has the power to change, alter,
amend, or “update” the text; or to replace the text with something he or she thinks works better; or to “interpret” the text
into oblivion to meet the needs of changing circumstances. In
short, let some judicial nominee claim the power to change the
preexisting meaning of the text without a formal constitutional
amendment.
I would like to see what would happen if a judicial nominee
candidly asserted the theory that lies beneath the concept of
super precedent—or for that matter candidly asserted any
nonoriginalist method of interpretation that would elevate the
precedents of the Supreme Court above the text of the Constitution itself. You won’t see that testimony because the text of
the Constitution is Kryptonite to super precedents, which is
61. See BARNETT, supra note 7, at 1–86.
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why legal academics and judges alike have to keep our written
Constitution confined to its lead-lined box in the National Archive.
CONCLUSION: THE IRONY OF SUPER PRECEDENT
The fact that two scholars as prominent and insightful as
Dan Farber and Michael Gerhardt have both advanced the super precedent idea just now suggests that super precedent may
be in line to supplant “popular constitutionalism” as the constitutional theory du jour. But perhaps both approaches have
something in common. Both want to take the Constitution
away from the current sitting Supreme Court. Whereas popular
constitutionalists want to give the power of interpretation either to the legislature (in Mark Tushnet’s version)62 or to “the
People themselves” (in Larry Kramer’s version),63 Farber and
Gerhardt both want to give the power of interpretation to past
Supreme Court Justices.
Unlike popular constitutionalists, however, Farber and
Gerhardt are all in favor of being ruled by the “dead hand” of
the past, provided the hand is that of dead Justices and not the
founders. Despite this difference, one gets the sneaking suspicion that the common objective of both approaches is to diminish the discretion of this particular Supreme Court—in particular its discretion to restore the lost clauses of the Constitution,
assuming it had any inclination to do so. If it ever did have
such a notion, the existence of super precedent—at least as currently defended—provides no reason for it to refrain.
The concept of super precedent creates one final and delicious irony. If it really has become unthinkable to reverse some
particular policy for the reasons stressed by Farber and
Gerhardt, then it would not ultimately matter if the Justices
ruled on a modern case in a way that would reiterate their support of the original meaning of the text. The only thing that the
famous super precedents have accomplished is to mandate or
forbid governmental policies, and these positions have come to
be so widely accepted that no one would politically challenge

62. See MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE
COURTS 33–53, 177–94 (1999).
63. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 73–92 (2004). But see Larry Alexander &
Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594
(2005) (reviewing and critiquing KRAMER, supra).

BARNETT_3FMT

1250

05/17/2006 09:08:26 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[90:1232

them, even if they were now free to do so under a corrected interpretation of the Constitution.
Consider, for example, the case of Bolling v. Sharpe,64
which held that segregated schools in the District of Columbia
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.65
Imagine that this case was wrongly decided because the Equal
Protection Clause (and the Privileges or Immunities Clause)
applies only to the states and there is no comparable constitutional requirement of racial equality imposed on the federal
government.66 If this were the case, under a corrected reading
of the Constitution, the federal government would be free legally to segregate the public schools in the District of Columbia
(though states would still be barred from doing so). Given the
embeddedness of the norm against racial segregation, however,
is it imaginable that any Congress would resegregate the D.C.
public schools? Not if Farber and Gerhardt are correct in their
descriptive claim about super precedents. Assuming they are
right, the only practical consequence of reversing Bolling today
would be to remove a barrier in current constitutional law to
federal racial preferences aimed at assisting rather than subordinating African Americans.
In other words, while the sociological existence of super
precedent provides no normative barrier to restoring the original meaning of the Constitution’s famous lost clauses,67 it
would severely mitigate any practical harm of doing so. Adopting the original meaning of the Constitution, therefore, would
in no way “turn back the clock” on the substantial moral progress we have made over the past fifty years. And for this everyone who, like Superman, believes in the “never-ending battle
64. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
65. Id. at 500.
66. I express no opinion on the merits of this claim—which confronts all
textualists, whether or not they are originalists. See generally David Bernstein, Bolling, Equal Protection, Due Process, and Lochnerphobia, 93 GEO. L.J.
1253 (2005) (explaining the problem and defending the correctness of Bolling
on originalist-textualist grounds).
67. The Famous Lost Clauses are the Commerce Clause, Necessary and
Proper Clause, Second Amendment, Ninth Amendment, and Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Randy E. Barnett, Was
the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service in an Organized Militia?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 237, 243–77 (2004) (discussing the original meaning of
the Second Amendment) (reviewing H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G.
MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, HOW THE SECOND
AMENDMENT FELL SILENT (2002)); BARNETT, supra note 7, at 153–334 (discussing the original meaning of the rest).
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for Truth, Justice, and the American Way,”68 including originalists, should be grateful.

68. The Adventures of Superman!, supra note 33.

